

SINGAPORE TERRORISM THREAT ASSESSMENT REPORT 2026



SINGAPORE FACES A HEIGHTENED THREAT OF TERRORISM

The terrorism threat to Singapore remains **high**.

The ongoing conflicts in the Middle East have contributed to a volatile global security environment and elevated the terrorism threat worldwide. Terrorist and extremist groups have exploited the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the United States (US) / Israel-Iran conflict to spread propaganda, deepen grievances and incite their supporters to mount attacks against their perceived enemies.

These tensions have also contributed towards growing hostility between communities. Anti-Semitism has surged in many parts of the world, while anti-Muslim rhetoric and Islamophobia have also intensified, fuelled by developments in the Middle East and far-right extremist narratives. In some cases, such hatred has translated into violence.


October 2025

During the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur, a man drove a vehicle into pedestrians before stabbing worshippers at a synagogue in Manchester, United Kingdom.



May 2026

A shooting carried out by two teenage gunmen at the Islamic Centre of San Diego resulted in three deaths.



The threat posed by global Islamist terror groups, such as **Al-Qaeda (AQ)** and the **Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS)**, has persisted. They continue to actively recruit, disseminate propaganda and raise funds for their terror activities. Both AQ and ISIS retain the intent, ambition and capacity to inspire and conduct terror attacks. They have also leveraged Artificial Intelligence (AI) to produce appealing propaganda to increase their ranks and incite attacks.¹ AQ has also continued to build its cyber capacity, with hacker group Cyber Jihad Movement pledging its allegiance to AQ in August 2025.

Despite sustained international counter-terrorism efforts, ISIS's ability to direct and inspire attacks around the world has not diminished. ISIS and its affiliates remain active across multiple regions including West and Central Africa, the Sahel and South Asia, while supporters elsewhere continue to conduct attacks in ISIS's name.

Examples of ISIS-linked Attacks Around the World

December 2025

A father-son duo conducted an ISIS-inspired attack on a Jewish Hanukkah event at Bondi Beach in Sydney, Australia, which killed 16 people.



February 2026

ISIS claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing at a Shi'ite Mosque in Islamabad, Pakistan, which killed at least 31 people.



July 2026

An ISIS supporter drove a van into a Pride celebration in Berlin, killing one and wounding 29 others.



¹For example, ISIS and its supporters have been using AI to quickly and cheaply produce propaganda, disguised as innocuous news broadcasts with AI-generated "news anchors", making it more difficult for tech companies to identify and block in their moderation efforts.

Copycat Attacks in Southeast Asia

Attacks further afield can inspire copycat attacks closer to home. For instance, both AQ and ISIS have praised the Bondi Beach attack and called on their supporters to emulate the attacks, including in our region.


Drawing inspiration from the Bondi Beach attack, online pro-ISIS Indonesian users incited lone-wolf attacks targeting the Jewish community in Indonesia. Later in April 2026, an ISIS-linked publication glorified the attacks and threatened further attacks.

In December 2025, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) published an essay glorifying the Bondi Beach shooting and called on its followers to target Jewish venues worldwide. In March 2026, AQAP issued a guide elevating the attack as a justified response to the conflict in Gaza and urged its sympathisers to replicate similar operations.



While there is currently no specific intelligence of an imminent terrorist attack against Singapore, Singapore and our interests remain an attractive target for terrorist elements.

This is for several reasons – our perceived friendly ties with Western nations, including the US and Israel, the presence of iconic landmarks and our status as a secular and multi-cultural society.



Terrorist propaganda continues to reference Singapore. On 9 March 2026, the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) released an issue of its propaganda magazine, Voice of Khorasan, which collectively labelled 64 countries as “Lands of Disbelief”, including Singapore and various other Southeast Asian countries such as Thailand and Vietnam.

Increasing Diversity of the Regional Extremism Landscape

Mirroring global trends, the violent extremist landscape in Southeast Asia is becoming more diverse. Far-Right Extremism (FRE) narratives continue to gain traction, particularly online, posing a threat to our national security as well as social cohesion and harmony. While FRE has traditionally been associated with white supremacist and ethnonationalist ideologies, online FRE communities are increasingly localising their narratives. These adapted narratives – which can encompass elements such as ‘East Asian supremacy’, anti-Muslim prejudice and anti-Semitism – are finding growing resonance among non-white individuals, including in Southeast Asia.

Several attacks and plots in Southeast Asia have also been linked to **Nihilistic Violent Extremism (NVE)** and related online subcultures such as the **True Crime Community (TCC)**. NVE refers to violence driven by a deep hostility towards society or humanity, where violence itself – rather than a clear political, religious or ideological goal – is a central motivation. The TCC is a decentralised online subculture centred on real-life violent crime, particularly serial killers and mass murderers. While the TCC is not inherently extremist, parts of the TCC subculture can overlap with NVE, where fascination with violent perpetrators turns into glorification, identification with their grievances or a desire to emulate their violent acts.

The boundaries between these different extremist milieus can also become blurred online. NVE-linked subcultures, FRE communities and other extremist movements can interact in shared spaces online, allowing violent ideas, narratives, symbols, terminology and memes to spread between them. This cross-pollination can normalise violence, and allow susceptible individuals to draw from multiple extremist influences to develop their own motivations for violence.

November 2025

Fuelled by personal grievances, a 17-year-old active TCC participant detonated four Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) at his high school in Jakarta, Indonesia, injuring at least 96. He had drawn ideological and aesthetic inspiration from FRE symbols, slogans and attackers.



February 2026

A junior high school student and active TCC participant in West Kalimantan, Indonesia, detonated four IEDs at his school, injuring one other student.



June 2026


Two youths aged 14 and 15 years old conducted an NVE-linked school shooting in Tacloban City, Philippines, killing three and injuring 20 others.



Self-Radicalisation Remains Key Terrorism Threat in Singapore

Against this increasingly complex external threat landscape, self-radicalisation remains the key driver of Singapore's domestic terrorism threat. Extremist propaganda and narratives originating overseas can reach individuals in Singapore quickly through online platforms, while overseas conflicts can serve as powerful triggers for radicalisation. Since the issuance of the last Singapore Terrorism Threat Assessment Report (STTAR) in July 2025, ISD has dealt with eight Singaporeans under the Internal Security Act (ISA), seven of whom were self-radicalised.² The majority were youths.

Self-radicalisation cases since 2015



²The remaining case involves 30-year-old Muhammad Jihadul Mustaqim bin Mahmud, who was issued a Restriction Order for his intention to engage in politically-motivated violence overseas. He was not assessed to be radicalised at the point of investigation, as he did not exhibit a deep ideological commitment towards an extremist ideology or belief.

OVERSEAS CONFLICTS AND DEVELOPMENTS HAVE HEIGHTENED THE THREAT OF ATTACK AGAINST SINGAPORE

Singapore and Southeast Asia continue to feel the ripple effects of the geopolitical tensions and instability in the Middle East. Activities by Iran's **Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)** and its "Axis of Resistance" network of armed proxies – including **HAMAS** in Gaza, **Hizbollah** in Lebanon, **Kata'ib Hizballah** in Iraq and the **Houthis** in Yemen, among others – have elevated the threat of terrorism beyond the immediate theatre of conflict in the Middle East.

Heightened Risk of Attacks by Iran's IRGC and Network of Armed Proxies

Even prior to the ongoing US / Israel-Iran conflict, Iran and its armed proxies had been linked to plots for covert asymmetric attacks targeting Israeli / Jewish interests in various countries.³

The threat has escalated significantly since the US and Israel's military operation against Iran in February 2026, which has triggered a wave of retaliation by Iran and its armed proxies extending beyond the Middle East. A series of at least 20 such attacks and attempted attacks targeting US and Israeli / Jewish interests occurred in a short span of time across Europe, Canada and the US. These attacks were claimed by a newly emerged terrorist

group, **Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamiya (HAYI)**. This group is reportedly a front for the IRGC-backed Iraqi armed militia Kata'ib Hizballah. In June 2026, 22 countries issued a joint statement to condemn the lethal plotting and actions by Iran's IRGC and Ministry of Intelligence and Security in Europe, North America and Australia.⁴ Of note, the HAYI-linked attacks involved a modus operandi known as "gig terrorism", where organised crime groups and individuals with no apparent ideological motives, are recruited to perpetrate acts of terrorism in exchange for money. Such recruitment has taken place through social media and gaming platforms, and involved youths.

HAYI-linked Attacks and Plots

March 2026

HAYI claimed responsibility for at least two attacks in Canada, one against the US consulate in Toronto, and the other on a synagogue.



March 2026

Two individuals were arrested just as they were trying to detonate an explosive device at the Bank of America headquarters in Paris, France. One of the perpetrators was recruited on Snapchat.



April 2026

Stabbing of two Jewish men in London marked a pivot in HAYI's tactics from arson and sabotage to direct lethal attacks against individuals.



³ For example, in August 2025, Australian authorities linked two anti-Semitic attacks on a Sydney deli and Melbourne synagogue in 2024 to the IRGC, and expelled the Iranian ambassador to Australia.

⁴ The 22 countries are Albania, Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, France, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, the UK and the US.

US Arrest of a Key Operative Linked to HAYI

In May 2026, Iranian-Iraqi national Mohammad Baqer Saad Dawood Al-Saadi (Baqer) was arrested in Türkiye and charged in the US for plotting to attack a synagogue in New York City and two other Jewish centres in Los Angeles and Scottsdale, Arizona.



A commander of Kata'ib Hizballah and its front HAYI, Baqer is believed to have directed at least 20 HAYI-linked attacks and attempted attacks on US and Jewish interests across Europe, the US and Canada. He also helped create and disseminate propaganda videos of the attacks on social media channels.

Baqer is said to have a close relationship with senior IRGC leaders such as Qasem Soleimani who was killed in a US air strike in 2020.

Tried to Visit Singapore

Baqer had applied for visas to visit Singapore on three separate occasions in 2023 and 2024, but did not eventually travel to Singapore. Nevertheless, he was believed to have travelled to Southeast Asia in recent years. Had he attempted to enter Singapore, he would have been denied entry.

We do not discount the possibility that Baqer's travel to this region could have been for terrorism purposes, and he could have set his sight on targeting Singapore, including US and Israeli / Jewish interests here. ISD is working with our intelligence partners to investigate into Baqer's activities.



Singapore is no Stranger to the Threat of Iranian Proxies Attempting to Operate and Plot Attacks Here

In the 1990s, Lebanon's Hizbollah, another Iranian proxy, tried to recruit Singaporeans through religious study groups, tasking five Singaporeans to form a cell to gather intelligence by taking photographs of the Israeli and US embassies in Singapore. However, they refused to do so.



Separately, in the mid-1990s, Hizbollah operatives also conducted surveillance of Singapore's coastline, intending to attack US naval vessels and Israeli commercial ships sailing through the Singapore Strait.

Threat Posed by HAMAS

Following Israel's military response to HAMAS's 7 October 2023 attacks, HAMAS's operational capabilities in Gaza have been significantly weakened. This has raised concerns that HAMAS would pivot towards conducting attacks abroad and going global with its external operations. The threat is underscored by the discoveries of HAMAS's weapon caches and disrupted plots, targeting Jewish and Israeli interests, in Europe since 2023.

HAMAS Plots Uncovered in Europe

Between 2023 and 2025, at least eight suspected HAMAS-linked members / operatives were arrested across Europe, including in Germany, the UK and Austria. These individuals had planned to use weapons and ammunition stored in these countries to carry out attacks against Jewish targets in Europe.

Investigations revealed that HAMAS had laid the groundwork several years prior to the 7 October attacks. In April 2019, a Germany-based operative travelled across Europe to set up several weapon depots for HAMAS, including in Bulgaria. He was arrested in 2023.

These arrests underscore the transnational nature of HAMAS's external operations, which were believed to have been directed by senior HAMAS leadership.



HAMAS in Southeast Asia

As part of the ceasefire agreement and the Gaza Peace Plan in January and October 2025, thousands of Palestinian prisoners were released from Israeli jails, with many resettled in third countries. Among them were 15 ex-prisoners with HAMAS links and militant experience who resettled in Malaysia.⁵ It is possible that more ex-prisoners with dangerous antecedents could similarly relocate to Southeast Asia, presenting security risks to the region.

These developments are of concern given HAMAS operatives' previous attempts to use Southeast Asia as a base for recruitment and attack planning against Israeli targets in the region. In 2022, Philippine authorities uncovered attempts by Fares Al Shikli @ Bashir, purportedly head of HAMAS's foreign liaison section then, to establish the group's presence in the Philippines.

Between 2016 and 2018, Bashir had several meetings with a Filipino citizen in Malaysia to discuss the recruitment of Filipino militant groups to conduct attacks against targets in the Philippines in exchange for financial assistance. Bashir had also reportedly discussed theoretical bomb-making training with the Filipino citizen on one occasion in Malaysia in 2016.



Against the backdrop of heightened threats against Israeli and Jewish interests worldwide, **the increased presence of HAMAS-linked operatives and networks in Southeast Asia could increase the risk of the region being used for recruitment, facilitation, operational planning or attacks. This could have direct security implications for Singapore and our interests.**

A recently disrupted HAMAS plot illustrates how such risks could materialise. The plot, disrupted in Europe in May and June 2026, revealed an alleged network with significant operational links to Southeast Asia.

The HAMAS network allegedly recruited Palestinians in Europe to conduct attacks against Israeli-linked targets, while drawing on Southeast Asia for operational support. The alleged mastermind of the plot was arrested in Indonesia, while other operatives involved in the plot had reportedly travelled from Europe to Southeast Asia to receive training in making explosives. Investigators also reportedly uncovered discussions of possible attack plans against several Southeast Asian countries.

⁵ Many of these ex-prisoners were involved in attacks targeting civilians. For example, one individual was part of a HAMAS cell responsible for a 2003 suicide bombing in Jerusalem while another was convicted of planning a suicide bombing in Dimona in 2008.

Disrupted HAMAS Plot with Southeast Asia Nexus

1

The HAMAS network had reportedly recruited Palestinians in Cyprus and Greece where attacks were being planned. Operatives were allegedly tasked to conduct reconnaissance of potential targets and procure commercially-available chemicals to produce IEDs.

2

One of the operatives was instructed to photograph Israeli-linked maritime targets in Cyprus. The network reportedly discussed plans to conduct attacks in other countries in Europe and Southeast Asia.



3

At least three members of the network reportedly travelled to Southeast Asia for training in a HAMAS-linked establishment, learning to make explosives using commercially-available chemical agents. The HAMAS operatives were also said to have held meetings in Türkiye and Southeast Asia to discuss attack operations in late 2025.

4

Between May and June 2026, Cypriot and Greek authorities arrested four HAMAS operatives involved in the plot. In July 2026, a closely coordinated international police operation led to the arrest of the 41-year-old alleged mastermind in Indonesia. He was extradited to Cyprus to face terrorism charges.



Potential Return of Foreign Terrorist Fighters to Southeast Asia


Syria remains in a fragile state, where renewed conflict and regional instability could create an environment conducive for the resurgence of terror groups such as AQ and ISIS. The withdrawal of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces from ISIS detention camps in January 2026 has raised concerns about ISIS potentially replenishing its ranks from escapees who have fled these camps. Furthermore, ISIS operates the “Cubs of the Caliphate” cells in Syrian refugee camps, indoctrinating and smuggling youths to Syrian desert camps for training and induction into ISIS.

January-February 2026

An estimated 15,000 to 20,000 people including ISIS-linked individuals fled Al-Hol camp, one of the largest detention camps.

January 2026

A separate prison break at al-Shaddadi prison saw around 120 ISIS fighters escape, although many were later recaptured.



Prior to the escapes, approximately 700 to 1,200 Southeast Asian Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs) and their families were believed to be based in northeastern Syrian camps. The continued allegiance to ISIS by a likely Malaysian Facebook user, who reportedly posted about her alleged escape with her children from Al-Hol camp in January 2026, underscores the threat. In February 2026,

it was also reported that 308 individuals, claiming to be Indonesian escapees from the camp, had reported to the Indonesian Embassy in Damascus. The potential return of such FTFs to Southeast Asia, especially if undetected, would heighten the terrorism threat, as they could plot attacks, impart operational know-how or inspire others.

Regional Counter-Terrorism Efforts

Regional authorities have undertaken decisive action to detect and disrupt terror threats amidst the heightened security climate, particularly with the continued resonance of pro-ISIS narratives in the online space.

Given the transnational nature of the terrorism threat, ISD collaborates closely with our foreign intelligence and security partners, including those in this region, to exchange intelligence and disrupt threats.

Since April 2025, Malaysian authorities have reportedly arrested at least 42 individuals for pro-ISIS activities, including recruitment, fundraising, spreading of ideology and planning of attacks.



Indonesian authorities have reportedly arrested at least 19 individuals for pro-ISIS activities since October 2025, including those involved in an online network that exposed at least 110 children aged 10 to 18 years old to ISIS indoctrination and recruitment.





SELF-RADICALISATION REMAINS THE KEY DRIVER OF THE DOMESTIC TERRORISM THREAT, WITH INDIVIDUALS INCREASINGLY DRAWING FROM A DIVERSE AND OVERLAPPING MIX OF EXTREMIST IDEOLOGIES

From 2015 to June 2026, 67 self-radicalised individuals – comprising 55 Singaporeans and 12 foreigners – were dealt with under the ISA and issued with ODs or ROs. Singaporeans remain vulnerable to extremist influences, given the easy accessibility to terrorist propaganda and extremist ideologies peddled online. Overseas geopolitical conflicts and developments also continue to fuel the spread of violent extremist ideas to our shores.

Amongst the eight individuals dealt with under the ISA since the last STTAR in July 2025, most of them were self-radicalised by Islamist extremist ideologies. These included ISIS's violent ideology as well as extremist narratives capitalising on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. At the same time, the extremist influences and motivations for violence seen in Singapore are becoming more diverse, and they increasingly overlap. Within the past year, three Singaporeans dealt with under the ISA were radicalised by Composite Violent Extremism (CoVE).⁶



⁶CoVE, which ISD has previously referred to as 'salad bar' extremism, refers to a form of violent extremism where individuals subscribe to multiple, and sometimes conflicting, extremist ideologies, rather than adhering to a coherent or unified worldview. This results in a personalised composite belief system, which the individual uses to justify violence. The term CoVE is aligned with more current literature on this ideological typology.

New ISA Cases since July 2025



Muhammad Jihadul Mustaqiim bin Mahmud (Jihadul), 30 years old, issued RO in July 2025 – Aspired to take up arms against former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria, and for Türkiye against Greece, to correct perceived political injustices.



14-year-old youth issued RO in September 2025 – First CoVE youth who was an ISIS supporter, and also subscribed to anti-Semitic and anti-establishment aspects of far-right extremism, identified as an incel⁷, and supported far-left ideologies such as socialism and communism.



14-year-old youth issued RO in November 2025 – ISIS supporter who aspired to travel overseas to fight for ISIS and die a martyr.



Cyrus Dzulqarnain Al-Shahriar (Cyrus), 19 years old, issued RO in March 2026 – CoVE youth who subscribed to pro-HAMAS, anti-LGBTQ and anti-Western beliefs, and was influenced by Islamist accelerationism⁸ and violent incel ideologies.



Tarmizi bin Mohd Taha (Tarmizi), 30 years old, detained in March 2026 – HAMAS supporter who wanted to travel to the Palestinian territories to join HAMAS, and was willing to conduct attacks in Singapore, if instructed to do so by HAMAS.



15-year-old youth detained in April 2026 – ISIS supporter who wanted to establish an Islamic caliphate in Southeast Asia through violent means, and planned to conduct a local attack using a 'pressure cooker' bomb.



Tan Jun Jie (Tan), 19 years old, detained in May 2026 – ISIS supporter who planned to engage in armed violence overseas, conduct knife attacks against local military and LGBTQ targets, and had attempted to launch cyberattacks against Muslim organisations he deemed as deviant.



14-year-old youth detained in June 2026 – CoVE youth who supported ISIS, concurrently subscribed to aspects of far-right extremist ideologies, and idolised mass shooters. He planned to conduct a mass-casualty stabbing attack at his school in June 2026.

⁷ Incel, short for "involuntary celibate", refers to a subculture of individuals, mostly men, who identify as being unable to find a romantic or sexual partner despite desiring one. The incel community often expresses frustration, anger and resentment towards society, women and those they perceive as more sexually successful. Some incel ideologies have been linked to misogyny, violence and extremism.

⁸ Accelerationism, in the extremist context, promotes the hastened collapse of modern societal structures and political systems, often through the use of violence, based on the perception that the current world order is flawed or "broken". The term was popularised by, and often associated with, the white supremacist movement, although it has also been appropriated by other extremist elements. In Cyrus' case, he was influenced by a strand of Islamist accelerationism which encouraged the use of violence to hasten societal collapse, to then establish Islam as the leading global civilisation.

ISIS Propaganda Remains a Key Radicalising Influence in Singapore

ISIS's terrorist propaganda, which remain easily accessible online, continues to radicalise Singaporeans. Among the eight Singaporeans who were dealt with under the ISA over the past year, five were ISIS supporters. All of them were youths under the age of 21 and were first exposed to pro-ISIS materials on social media platforms. Three of these youths had intended to mount ISIS-inspired attacks in Singapore using simple, easily available weapons.

14-year-old ISIS supporter issued RO in November 2025




- Pledged allegiance to ISIS in June 2024.
- Conducted "digital jihad" by posting pro-ISIS content daily, including gameplay footage from online gaming platforms where he recreated ISIS-style executions and attacks.
- Aspired to travel to Syria, Afghanistan, Africa, Iraq or Bali in Indonesia to fight for ISIS and die a martyr when he was older.



“As part of my preparation to participate in 'Jihad', I would role play as [an] ISIS member at home during my CQB [Close Quarter Battle] sessions. During my practice sessions, I would use my toy AK-47 weapon as my weapon of choice and put on the balaclava to practice my movement. I am aware that this was the weapon of choice for the ISIS fighters. When I practice, I do it to prepare myself for when I perform 'hijrah' and join the battle in Syria or Afghanistan as an ISIS member.”

– Extract of 14-year-old ISIS supporter's statement during investigations

Tan



- Planned to travel overseas to undertake armed jihad alongside ISIS in Somalia.
- Attempted cyberattacks in mid-2025 against websites of several local and foreign Muslim organisations he deemed deviant, using malware downloaded online.
- Plotted knife attacks targeting Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) personnel and LGBTQ students at his school, whom he perceived as "kuffars" (disbelievers) and un-Islamic.

15-year-old ISIS supporter detained in April 2026



- Pledged allegiance to ISIS on social media in late 2025; wanted to travel to Syria or Iraq to fight for ISIS.
- Aspired to conduct an attack in Singapore in support of ISIS using 'pressure cooker' bombs after watching an online video on the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing.
- Made preparations to establish an Islamic caliphate in Southeast Asia through violent means as he was unable to join ISIS in Syria.



Image: 15-year-old ISIS supporter's self-created flag to represent his regional Islamic caliphate, which he had printed via an e-commerce retailer.

“I saw ISIS as an organisation that promoted the Islamic Caliphate as well as the Syariah Law... Having learnt about ISIS, I felt proud [of] its existence and ability to establish an Islamic Caliphate with a very high success rate. In my mind, I attributed ISIS's success to their use of arms... [My] interest in [establishing an] Islamic Caliphate is actually based on ISIS. As I could not join ISIS in Syria, I developed an idea [of] creating a Caliphate and One Ummah movement on my own...”

– Extract of 15-year-old ISIS supporter's statement during investigations

Overseas Conflicts Continue to Have a Radicalising Impact in Singapore

Since the re-escalation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in October 2023, ISD has dealt with at least nine individuals under the ISA whose radicalisation was triggered or accelerated by the conflict – this includes three new cases since the last STTAR in July 2025. These individuals initially came across news on the conflict after HAMAS's attacks on 7 October 2023, before being exposed to extremist online narratives that capitalised on the conflict to promote violence.

These cases show that nearly three years on, the conflict continues to have a radicalising impact on Singaporeans.

Singaporeans remain deeply concerned about the dire humanitarian crises in Gaza and it is natural to sympathise with civilians affected by the conflict. However, such concern should not be conflated with support for terrorist or militant groups that exploit the conflict to promote discord and legitimise armed violence.

Tarmizi

- Joined social media channels discussing the conflict following 7 October 2023, and became exposed to HAMAS propaganda which he would frequently rewatch.
- Posted pro-HAMAS material on social media to garner support for the group and was in online contact with an alleged foreign HAMAS member.
- Planned to travel to the Palestinian territories to join HAMAS, and was willing to carry out attacks in Singapore if instructed by HAMAS.



“As a result of my exposure to postings, videos and images on various [online] channels, I became motivated to join HAMAS in Gaza, Palestine, to fight against those I believed to be enemies of Palestine, namely Zionists and Jews.”

– Extract of Tarmizi's statement during investigations

Cyrus

- Exposed to pro-HAMAS narratives online after 7 October 2023, and came to support the group and its violent actions.
- Considered travelling to Gaza to join HAMAS but lacked resources to do so.
- Glorified HAMAS on social media, and incited violence against “Zionists” online.



“I agree that the attack by Hamas on Israel is justified. I am aware that HAMAS attacked and killed innocent Israeli civilians at a music fest, and raided civilians' homes during the attack... I feel satisfaction, even to date, when I view the online photos and videos of the 7th October attack and the death of both Israeli soldiers and civilians during the said attack.”

– Extract of Cyrus' statement during investigations

Apart from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, lesser-known conflicts overseas have also motivated Singaporeans to engage in violence. This is often facilitated by grievance-fuelled narratives surrounding such conflicts, which may be framed as part of a broader religious, political or ideological cause.

Jihadul

- Initially wanted to fight alongside Syrian rebel groups to overthrow the Assad regime.
- After the Assad regime fell in December 2024, considered taking up arms in defence of Türkiye against Greece, should their territorial disputes escalate into an armed conflict.
- Saw armed violence as a legitimate means to correct political injustices; was also driven by a desire to escape his personal setbacks.
- Took steps to enhance his tactical skills in preparation for fighting overseas (e.g., engaging in live-firing activities overseas).

“Türkiye is constantly having issues with Greece... and there is a possibility that it could escalate to an armed conflict. If this happens while I am in Türkiye, I would gladly volunteer to assist the Turks by taking up arms and fight for their country.”

– Extract of Jihadul's statement during investigations



Growing Diversity of Extremist Ideologies and Motivations

Beyond traditional forms of extremism, where individuals are typically radicalised by a single ideology or worldview, Singapore has seen the emergence of self-radicalised individuals, especially youths, who draw from a mix of extremist ideologies and beliefs.

Composite Violent Extremism (CoVE)

CoVE refers to a form of violent extremism where individuals subscribe to multiple, and sometimes conflicting, extremist ideologies, rather than adhering to a single, coherent or unified worldview. This results in a personalised composite belief system, which the individual uses to justify violence. This phenomenon has also been referred to in literature as ‘salad bar’ extremism, however, CoVE is increasingly accepted as a more accurate term.



All three cases of CoVE dealt with under the ISA involved Singaporeans under the age of 21, reflecting a broader concern globally about youths' susceptibility to radicalisation by CoVE. As digital natives who spend a significant amount of time online, youths can be exposed to a wide range of extremist contents and communities across different platforms. This can create opportunities for them to engage with and be influenced by ideas from different extremist movements.

At the same time, youths' critical thinking and cognitive skills are still developing, which may make them more susceptible to selectively embracing ideas from different extremist ideologies, even when these ideas are contradictory. Individuals radicalised by CoVE may have a shallow understanding of the ideologies they adopt, and their beliefs can shift over time. In some cases, their attraction towards certain extremist beliefs or

movements may also be driven by a desire to appear 'edgy' or 'cool', or an attraction to the niche aesthetics (e.g., imagery, symbols, online culture) of such extremist movements, rather than a deep commitment to their underlying ideology or cause.

Nevertheless, the lack of a clear and coherent ideology does not make the CoVE threat less serious. Drawing from multiple extremist ideologies can give individuals a wider range of grievances, narratives and events that could potentially trigger them to plan or commit acts of violence quickly. Their beliefs can also evolve rapidly as they encounter new extremist content online. In all three of our local CoVE cases, the youths had aspirations to engage in violence locally and/or overseas – one of them had even taken steps to prepare for an attack in Singapore.

Three Local CoVE Cases

14-year-old CoVE youth issued RO in September 2025



- ISIS supporter who aspired to become an ISIS fighter in Syria.
- Concurrently subscribed to the violent anti-Semitic beliefs espoused in far-right extremism. However, being a Muslim, he rejected the anti-Muslim rhetoric of far-right extremism.
- Supported aspects of far-left extremism, particularly socialism and communism, which he perceived to be anti-Zionist and “anti-imperialist”.
- Identified as an incel, stemming from low self-esteem over his physical appearance and subsequent exposure to incel “looksmaxxing” content. His interest in the incel community intensified his hatred towards females, but he had no intentions to enact violence against women.


“ For Far Right Extremism (FRE), I like the cultural views adopted by FRE groups which are conservative and traditional. They also reject the social norms which are influenced by the West... For Far Left Extremism (FLE), I like the FLE economy where they [adopt] National Socialism... They are also anti-Zionist and anti-imperialist. On National Socialism, I perceive them to be anti-capitalist [as] they regard these ideologies as Jewish ideologies... However, I transited into Islamic Extremism (IE) as they too disregard establishment and social norms influenced by the West. **To me, FRE and FLE ideologies are more secular but IE is something I could relate to more as a Muslim. To me, certain part of the ideologies from these three groups are similar in nature.** ”

– Extract of 14-year-old CoVE youth’s statement during investigations

Cyrus



- Inspired by school shooters, he fantasised about committing violence against LGBTQ individuals and couples in his school, although he did not make any plans or preparations to this end.
- In addition to supporting HAMAS, held strong anti-West / US and anti-LGBTQ views, and made online posts inciting violence against Westerners and glorifying AQ’s 9/11 attacks in 2001 and the 2002 Bali bombings.
- Pledged allegiance to an online Islamist extremist group that propagated Islamist accelerationism – which encouraged the use of violence to hasten societal collapse, to then establish Islam as the leading global civilisation.
- Identified as an incel and expressed hatred against women.



Images above: To pledge allegiance to the online Islamist extremist group, Cyrus had posted photos of himself at the Esplanade area, holding his smartphone with the online Islamist extremist group’s e-publication displayed on the screen. The e-publication has been redacted in the photos shown above.

14-year-old CoVE youth detained in June 2026



- Supported ISIS and was willing to attack non-Muslims if instructed by ISIS.
- Subscribed to aspects of far-right extremist ideologies, such as anti-Semitic, accelerationist and racial supremacist beliefs.

- Influenced by far-right terrorists and mass shooters he idolised, such as Brenton Tarrant and the Columbine High School shooters.
- Drafted a 21-page manifesto detailing his plan to conduct a stabbing attack against non-Muslim teachers and students at his school in June 2026.

A CALL TO ACTION

A gift written to all [REDACTED] by yours truly



A MANIFESTO WRITTEN BY [REDACTED]

THE WEAPONS USED

Now, this isn't going to be some American shit where I shoot up a school and then myself. No, no, no. This is Singapore, with gun controls, you can never really get your hands onto anything despite having a license, which can at most get you an airsoft. Which is why I have replicated Stephen Balliet (yes, that fucking loser) bomb recipe into a few pipe bombs.

I will also bring a pen knife to stab people in case the bombs don't detonate or I simply do not have enough to kill everyone in my list (which will be in the next tab). These bombs and knife will be the closest thing I can ever get to a weapon. Better than nothing, right?

THE LIST OF KILLS

It's the moment that you have all been waiting for. The people I will be killing. I will first begin by telling you who I WON'T kill.

- I won't be killing any secondary ones as I had just met them. Also, none of them are assholes worthy of my wrath
- None of my seniors, all sec 3-5 will not be killed as I know very few of them and all of them treat me well and so therefore, they won't be killed

Now, it will be who I will be killing:

- Sec 2's, mostly ranging from [REDACTED] as most of the girls as well as some of the boys there have pissed me off throughout my sec school life
- Teachers; the main group that had made a life a living hell. Everyday, it feels like the teachers are always targeting me
- Last but not least (if possible and the police haven't arrived), myself. I will go through the pain of my victims unwillingly and die a martyr, willing to be remembered.

Image above: Extracts of the 14-year-old CoVE youth's 21-page manifesto, titled "A Call to Action", which he drafted in January 2026 in preparation for the attack he intended to conduct in his school in June 2026.

Notable CoVE attacks outside of Singapore

In August 2022, 20-year-old Ethan Miller opened fire at a grocery store in Oregon, US, killing two and injuring two others before committing suicide. He reportedly claimed inspiration from the 1999 Columbine High School shooting, expressed a range of misogynistic and racist sentiments, and aired various grievances related to the Covid-19 pandemic, but did not fit into a single ideological category.

In December 2024, 15-year-old Natalie Rupnow shot and killed a teacher and student, injuring six others at the Abundant Life Christian School in Wisconsin, US. She then fatally shot herself. She was reportedly motivated to violence by a combination of factors. She had allegedly expressed admiration for the 1999 Columbine High School shooters, as well as racist and anti-Semitic views online.



Incel Ideology

Incel is short for “involuntary celibate”, which refers to a subculture of individuals, mostly men, who identify as being unable to find a romantic or sexual partner despite desiring one. Incel is a subset of the ‘manosphere’, a broad online network of communities centred on male supremacism, anti-feminism and grievance-based views about gender. Some incel ideologies have been linked to misogyny, violence and extremism.

July 2025

An 18-year-old French man who self-identified as an incel was detained for planning attacks on women.

March 2026

A 15-year-old boy influenced by incel online subcultures conducted a school shooting in Mexico killing two female teachers.

May 2026

A 19-year-old man was imprisoned in the UK for criminal and terrorism-related charges; he had subscribed to far-right, ISIS and incel ideologies.



Some common terminology / slangs / persons associated with incel culture online, which we have also seen in our ISA cases, include:

Red Pill

Derived from the film *The Matrix*, it refers to the belief that physical appearance primarily determines romantic success and that mainstream society deceives men about this.

Blue Pill

Incel pejorative for the mainstream belief that personality and effort determine romantic success. Used dismissively to describe those outside the incel worldview; being 'Blue Pilled' means being deceived by societal norms about relationships.

Black Pill

The defining ideology of violent incel extremism. The nihilistic conviction that physical appearance alone determines all romantic and social outcomes, that one's appearance is genetically fixed and irreversible, and that no self-improvement can change one's fate. In its most extreme expression, the Black Pill reframes personal grievance as justification for violence.

Trucel

A self-described 'real' incel with permanent and irremediable dating difficulties. Used to claim authenticity within the community and distinguish from those accused of being 'fakecels'.

Volcel

A person who is voluntarily celibate. Someone who could form relationships but chooses not to. Viewed with contempt in incel communities as they undermine the victimhood narrative central to incel identity.

Femoid / Foid

A dehumanising portmanteau of 'female' and 'humanoid'. Used to deny women full personhood. The adoption of this term indicates significant ideological deepening.

Looksmaxxing

Any attempt to maximise one's physical attractiveness — grooming, fitness, surgery or other self-modification. Viewed by some incels as a viable path to ascension i.e., successfully entering a romantic or sexual relationship; dismissed by 'Black Pillers' as futile.

Elliot Rodger

A mass murderer who perpetrated the 2014 Isla Vista attacks in California, US, was influenced by incel ideology. His manifesto documented his resentment towards women and society, referring to himself as 'The Supreme Gentleman' or 'Saint' and outlining his 'Day of Retribution' mass attack against the women who rejected him. His attacks are widely praised in the incel community with titles like 'Saint Elliot' and 'The Supreme Gentleman' used to venerate Rodger as a hero and role model.

The Government takes a serious view of any form of support for terrorism or extremist ideologies in Singapore, whether by Singaporeans or foreigners. ISD will take firm action against any individual in Singapore who supports, promotes, undertakes or makes preparations to undertake armed violence, regardless of how they rationalise such violence or where the violence takes place.





YOUTH RADICALISATION IS OF PRESSING CONCERN

There has been a marked increase in youth radicalisation cases dealt with under the ISA. In the past year alone, six out of eight new ISA cases involved youths aged 20 or below. The number of youth ISA cases in the past five years has almost quadrupled, from four cases between 2017 and 2021, to 15 cases from 2022 till present.

Of particular concern, those being radicalised are getting younger. Since June 2024, four 14-year-olds have been issued with ISA orders (three issued ROs,

one issued an OD), making them the youngest to have been dealt with under the ISA. This includes the 14-year-old CoVE youth detained in June 2026, who is the youngest individual to have been detained under the ISA to date.⁹

Despite their young ages, radicalised youths can pose a serious security threat. Of the 23 youth ISA cases since 2015, more than half (12) had plans to conduct attacks in Singapore.

Severity of the Youth Radicalisation Threat

The three youths, ages ranging from 14 to 19, detained between April and June 2026, had formulated local attack plans, and were close to executing them.



All three youths had identified easily available weapons for use in their attacks.

- Tan and the 14-year-old CoVE youth intended to use bladed weapons for their attacks, and had learnt lethal knife tactics from watching ISIS propaganda and execution tutorial videos.
- All three youths had also searched for bomb-making information online, with the 15-year-old and 14-year-old considering using homemade explosives for their local attacks.



I thought about conducting an attack using a ‘pressure cooker’ in Singapore. I would want to conduct this attack for ISIS... I had visualised the attack to be conducted inside an urban setting, and there would be multiple civilian casualties, damage building and a huge crater... In my view, conducting an attack via ‘pressure cooker’ bombs would guarantee a higher chance of survival for me as compared to performing an armed attack... **[A] few weeks prior to my arrest by ISD, I was still thinking about the pressure cooker bomb and how I could use the bomb to conduct attacks in Singapore.** ”

– Extract of the 15-year-old ISIS supporter’s statement during investigations

⁹ Apart from this 14-year-old youth detained in June 2026, three other 14-year-old self-radicalised youths were separately issued with ROs under the ISA in June 2024, and September and November 2025. Please refer to ISD’s press releases dated 15 July 2024, 9 September 2025 and 28 January 2026 for details.

At the point of his arrest, the 14-year-old was merely a few weeks away from carrying out his planned attack at his school.



- The youth's 21-page attack manifesto glorified mass shooters and included details of his attack plan, choice of weapons and targets. He intended to release the manifesto on social media platforms a day before his planned attack.
- The youth had identified tactical gear and apparel to be used during his attack and planned to livestream his attack, to mimic school shooters he admired.

“

In Jan 2026, I was more confident and decided to write the manifesto to come up with an attack plan... I intended for the manifesto to be broadcasted to all the students of [my school], the night before I conducted my attack... **I strongly believe in my manifesto and would have conducted the attack, should I not have been investigated by authorities.** ”

– Extract of the 14-year-old CoVE youth's statement during investigations



Images above: The 14-year-old had identified a kitchen knife and penknife from his home, as his attack weapons of choice. He chose to use a knife, stating that he had gained confidence over time in his ability to carry out a stabbing attack, after repeated viewings of ISIS execution and stabbing tutorial videos.

Apart from his plans to conduct knife attacks against SAF personnel and LGBTQ students, Tan also attempted to conduct cyberattacks against websites of Muslim organisations which he deemed as deviant, using readily accessible malware he downloaded online.



“ ... Anyways, the point is, I gave y'all enough time and patience. So, here's what I'm gonna do. With the skills that Allah has given me, nothing haram, everything within the Shariah, I'm going to use my skills to cyber attack these organisations and their forms of dakwah. InshaAllah, I hope I can take down their sites. Dox and expose the relevant individuals. ”

– Extract of Tan's recorded oral declaration justifying his attempted cyberattacks

ISD was able to detect and intervene in these cases before the individuals were able to carry out their planned attacks. However, the authorities may not always be able to detect every radicalised individual in time. **Family members, friends and others in the community therefore play an important role in recognising and reporting early signs of radicalisation.**


The majority of youths dealt with under the ISA had displayed signs of radicalisation to those around them,

such as sharing their extremist views and pro-ISIS contents with their family and friends. In Tan's case, his acquaintances had alerted the authorities after becoming aware of his extremist views and intention to enact violence locally and overseas. Similarly, someone at the 14-year-old CoVE youth's school had noticed his signs of radicalisation and alerted the authorities. These cases underscore the importance of taking signs of radicalisation seriously and reporting concerns early, before extremist beliefs escalate into violence.

Speaking at a Doorstop Media Interview on Three Self-Radicalised Singaporean Youths on 27 July 2026, Mr K Shanmugan, Senior Minister, Coordinating Minister for National Security and Minister for Home Affairs Said:



“ That is why it is extremely important to report early, and that allows for intervention early. And you know what, **you are actually helping the person because we – ISD, MHA – can prevent them from harming themselves and harming others**, and in early stages of radicalisation, we can arrange for measures like counselling. We don't even need to arrest or detain them. We can do it, without detaining through counselling. So I really encourage everyone to do your part, our part, to keep Singapore safe... ”



“ ... ISD and MHA have got to get it right every single time. The would-be attacker needs to get it right only once... people are getting radicalised much faster, and it's really not possible to always pick it up at the beginning, which is why **I emphasise the importance of family and friends. The moment you see something not quite right, please report. Don't just leave it to ISD and the police, because you know, we try our best, and so far, every single time, we have been successful in intervening. But don't take that for granted. This was close.** ”


Role of Online and Gaming Platforms in Youth Self-Radicalisation Cases

Online platforms continue to feature prominently in self-radicalisation cases, enabling extremist content to spread rapidly and accelerating the radicalisation process. Youths, who spend significant amounts of time online, may encounter violent extremist content within online communities or through algorithmic recommendations on social media. Repeated engagement with such content can reinforce extremist beliefs and create online ideological echo chambers.

Online gaming platforms, in particular, have featured in several recent youth radicalisation cases in Singapore. The youths have used online games to simulate terrorist attacks or mass shootings. Repeated exposure to

graphic violence, or to contents that recreate and glorify past terror attacks and mass shootings, can normalise youths' attitudes towards violence and reinforce their fascination with violent perpetrators. When combined with their exposure to extremist narratives, such environments may lower inhibitions towards violence, making susceptible individuals more receptive to the idea that violence is an acceptable or even necessary means to resolve perceived injustices or grievances. Over time, fantasies of violence rehearsed in virtual spaces may develop into intentions or plans to commit real-world violence.

Examples of Online Gaming Platforms Featured in Recent Local Cases



In the case of the 14-year-old ISIS supporter who was issued an RO in November 2025, he had recreated ISIS-style attacks and executions on Gorebox, a sandbox game which allows players to simulate a variety of violent scenarios such as shootings and stabbings. The youth dressed up his in-game character as an ISIS fighter, and simulated shooting prisoner characters or beheading them using knives to role-play as an ISIS fighter.

“ When playing [Gorebox], I realised that I had the ability to... simulate my desired scenarios involving execution and car bombing attacks... I would imagine the non-player characters (NPCs) as prisoners and set them to wear an orange outfit, standing in a row. I would then carry out execution on them by using a handgun (pistol) to shoot at them one by one or use knives to keep ‘stabbing’ into the NPCs head till it detached from the body... I had also included interactions with NPCs such as getting them to beg for mercy, asking not to be killed and crying. **I included this as I wanted to role-play as ISIS fighter killing the ‘disbelievers’ or enemies of ISIS.** ”

– Extract of the 14-year-old ISIS supporter's statement during investigations



Images above: Screenshots of the youth's Gorebox gameplay footage recreating ISIS-style attacks and executions, which he used to create pro-ISIS videos.

The 14-year-old CoVE youth detained in June 2026 had encountered online first-person shooter (FPS) games on Roblox which recreated real-life school shooting incidents, such as the 1999 Columbine High School shooting. This led him to search for more information on the attacks online, and he came to identify with and idolise several mass shooters over perceived shared personal grievances (e.g., being victims of bullying). The youth was addicted to such games, and would imagine his bullies as the in-game Non-Player Characters (NPCs), and felt gratification shooting at and killing them. His predisposition to violence in the virtual world eventually translated to aspirations to conduct real-world attacks.



“ I felt that I could relate to Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold, because I was also bullied. So, I took [the Roblox game that re-created school shootings] as a game that I could release my anger against those who bullied me. **I treated those Non-Player Characters (NPCs) in the game as my bullies and I felt good to kill them in the game...** Further, I also get to shoot the Police and SWAT officers because they had guns and bullet-proof vests and **I felt powerful.** ”

– Extract of the 14-year-old CoVE youth’s statement during investigations



Images above: Screenshots of the 14-year-old CoVE youth’s Roblox gameplay footage simulating school shootings.

Online Gaming Platforms Featuring n Overseas Extremism Cases

The “gamification” of extremist violence was evident in the 2019 Christchurch, New Zealand attacks, where the perpetrator Brenton Tarrant (Tarrant) drew on gaming references, aesthetics and online subcultures in the way he presented his violence. As an avid gamer, Tarrant referenced games like ‘Spyro the Dragon’ and ‘Fortnite’ in his manifesto, jokingly crediting them with shaping his ethnonationalist beliefs and teaching him to kill. Tarrant’s livestreamed attack from a first-person perspective, which mirrored the style of FPS games, inspired a wave of copycats, including the May 2026 San Diego Islamic Center shooting by two teenagers who dubbed themselves “Sons of Tarrant”.

Closer to home, online gaming platforms have also featured in youth radicalisation and recruitment cases in Southeast Asia. Since 2025, Indonesian and Philippine authorities have identified more than 100 minors who

were reportedly exposed to extremist content and grooming online, including gaming platforms. Some went on to develop plans for violence. In February 2026, the authorities foiled a plot to carry out a mass shooting at a school in Calabarzon, Philippines. The youths involved were reportedly directed from Roblox to other digital communication platforms where they were groomed and radicalised by extremist actors. Similarly, six Malaysian youths who were detained in February 2026 for involvement in ISIS-linked activities were reportedly heavily influenced through their online gaming activities, particularly on Roblox, where they spent long hours engaging with war-themed gameplay.



WHOLE-OF-SOCIETY EFFORTS ARE CRUCIAL TO COUNTERING TERRORISM


Singapore employs a multi-pronged approach to countering terrorism and violent extremism. Beyond detecting and disrupting security threats, extensive efforts are also invested in rehabilitating and reintegrating radicalised individuals into society, and working with community and government partners to raise public awareness on the terrorism threat and prevent radicalisation.



Rehabilitation and Reintegration


ISD adopts a comprehensive and holistic approach in the rehabilitation of detainees and supervisees, comprising religious / ideological, psychological and social rehabilitation. Since 2002, more than 80% of Singaporeans detained under the ISA have been released after making good progress in their rehabilitation.

Of the 156 Singaporeans issued with ISA orders for terrorism-related activities, 106 were issued with OD while 50 were issued with ROs. 87 of the 106 who were detained have been released. Of the 50 issued with ROs, 40 have since lapsed.



Example of the Rehabilitation Journey of a Former Self-Radicalised Youth

A then-15-year-old self-radicalised Singaporean was detained in December 2022 for his support for AQ and ISIS. He was prepared to engage in armed violence and martyrdom operations in Singapore or abroad to support the establishment of an Islamic caliphate and also considered conducting attacks against non-Muslims in Singapore.




The youth was eventually released on a Suspension Direction (SD) in December 2025, and intends to further his studies in an Institute of Higher Learning. Through rehabilitation efforts, he no longer holds extremist beliefs or any animosity towards non-Muslims, and has rejected the use of violence.



Strengthening Community Awareness and Resilience

Community partners play an important role in preventing and countering radicalisation. ISD continues to collaborate with partners such as the RRG and Inter-Agency Aftercare Group (ACG) on outreach activities to raise public awareness of terrorism and radicalisation, and equip the community to recognise signs of radicalisation.

Following RRG's launch of its "Counselling and Mentoring Manual for Youth" in May 2024, RRG, in collaboration with ISD, conducted a series of mosque engagements aimed at helping mosques become safe spaces, where individuals can seek help, consult and report radicalisation concerns. To date, RRG has engaged about 300 mosque staff and educators.



Recognising the growing threat of youth radicalisation, ISD has also partnered with the ACG and various madrasahs to organise youth forums and dialogues. These activities seek to help youths understand the dangers of radicalisation and how they can protect themselves and those around them from extremist influences.

On 17 November 2025, Madrasah Wak Tanjong Al-Islamiah and Madrasah Aljunied Al-Islamiah jointly organised the "#Click to Change: Youth, AI and Online Extremism" with support from Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura (MUIS) and the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA).



ISD works with the Ministry of Manpower and the Singapore Police Force (SPF) to disseminate Counter Violent Extremism messages through posters and text messages to the migrant worker community in Singapore. ISD also collaborates with its community partners such as the RRG to conduct outreach to the migrant workers at mosques and dormitories.



ISD had rolled out a counter-radicalisation module to all full-time National Servicemen (NSFs) from the SAF, SPF and Singapore Civil Defence Force (SCDF). ISD has been training the trainers in the National Service Training Cadre to deliver the module to the NSFs undergoing Basic NSF Training. Over 64,000 NSF recruits have been trained between 2022 and 2025.



Expanding Counter-Radicalisation Efforts

ISD continues to expand its counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation outreach to more sectors and community touchpoints. In 2025, ISD organised 67 workshops for over 2,500 participants in the youth sector, including student leaders and educators.



Countering Extremist Content Online

With the internet and social media continuing to be a key driver of self-radicalisation, efforts to reduce access to violent extremist content online are increasingly important. ISD works with SPF to identify and restrict access to online content that promotes terrorism and radicalisation or incites violence, including through measures under the Online Criminal Harms Act (OCHA).

In July 2026, SPF issued Disabling Directions against an online service provider and two Access Blocking Directions to Internet Service Providers to deal with terrorism-related content accessible by persons in Singapore. The offending videos and websites contained terrorism-related content, including material that

advocated for ISIS, mass shooters and violence. The content also glorified extremists and called for supporters to join their cause.

Investigations had established a direct nexus between such content and previous self-radicalisation cases in Singapore, where youths were radicalised after consuming content from these sites or obtained information from these sites to plot their attacks. These cases reinforce the need for the Government, technology platforms, community organisations, families and individuals to play their part in safeguarding Singapore from violent extremism.

Efforts to Enhance Counter-Terrorism Capabilities


ISD works closely with the various Home Team agencies to strengthen Singapore's preparedness against evolving terror threats. This includes regularly exercising and strengthening multi-agency response plans, enhancing frontline response capabilities and harnessing technologies to improve situational awareness and operational effectiveness.

Strengthening Response Capabilities

To maintain operational readiness, SPF regularly conducts counter-terrorism and emergency preparedness exercises with key partners, such as the SCDF, SAF, as well as community and industry partners from the Safety and Security Watch Group (SSWG), as part of the 'SafeSG, Together' national movement. From 5 May 2026 to 6 May 2026, SPF and SAF jointly conducted a large-scale counter-terrorism exercise with SCDF, ISD and Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore (CAAS). More than 1,100 personnel across the various agencies participated in the exercise, which tested and validated Singapore's multi-agency response plan to a terrorist attack.

SPF has also strengthened coordination among its specialist tactical units. SPF's Special Operations Group integrates its three elite Special Tactics Team (STTs) – Special Operations Command's Special Tactics and Rescue Unit, the Police Coast Guard's Special Task Squadron and the Gurkha Contingent's Gurkha Special Action Group – through the creation of a formal operational structure that has command and control over the three STTs. This enables the team to better coordinate their response and leverages the teams' unique strengths and expertise during complex public security incidents.

In June 2025, SPF's Protective Security Command operationalised its Strategic Location Response (SLR) deployment to enable a swifter response to public security incidents. SLR officers conduct high-visibility foot and vehicular patrols at key locations, including shopping centres and tourist attractions to deter terrorist attacks. SLR officers are also equipped with drones and counter-drone systems (e.g., handheld drone jammers).



Harnessing Technology to Strengthen Operational Effectiveness

SPF is also harnessing technology to strengthen its ability to respond to complex and fast-moving incidents. Launched in May 2026, SPF's Home Team SkyGuardian capability enables rapid Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) deployment during major incidents, providing real-time aerial coverage and AI-assisted tracking to build situational awareness before ground forces are deployed. The ability of these drones to fly into dangerous or inaccessible areas reduces officers' exposure in high-threat situations, while equipment such as loudspeakers and searchlights add further capabilities across a range of complex threat environments.

With UAS technology becoming more accessible and sophisticated, SPF continues to enhance its Counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems (C-UAS) capabilities and work with other government agencies to combat evolving UAS threats. SPF is also expanding its Police Camera (PolCam) network across Singapore to strengthen sensemaking and investigative capabilities to deal with both terror threats and crime.

January 2024 - March 2026

More than 30 exercises were conducted with SSWG members, including large-scale counter-terrorism exercises, codenamed 'Exercise Heartbeat', held in the vicinities of Singapore Sports Hub, Clarke Quay and National University of Singapore (NUS) University Town (UTown).



Mid-2030s

The PolCam network will be strategically deployed in areas with high footfall, such as commercial centres and public transport nodes. It is expected to comprise over 200,000 cameras by the mid-2030s and will significantly bolster public safety and security across Singapore.



Border Security

As Singapore's first line of defence against external security threats, the Immigration & Checkpoints Authority (ICA) continues to strengthen its capabilities at Singapore's borders through a multi-layered strategy. This includes harnessing cutting-edge technology as well as strengthening inter-agency coordination through regular Ground Deployment Exercises (GDX) with other Home Team departments and external stakeholders.

Since May 2024, ICA has implemented the New Clearance Concept (NCC), which facilitates contactless clearance and allows eligible travellers to clear immigration without presenting their passports by using facial and iris recognition. The combined use of both iris and facial scans allows for more accurate and secure identity verification, while providing travellers with a more seamless immigration clearance experience.

ICA is also strengthening its cargo and baggage screening capabilities. AI technology will be used to identify anomalies in the scanned images of cargo and baggage, thereby enhancing the detection of potential security threats and interception of suspicious items before they enter Singapore.

ICA also conducts regular joint exercises with other security agencies and stakeholders to enhance operational coordination in responding to border security incidents. On 11 November 2025, ICA, together with SPF, SCDF and the Singapore Cruise Centre Pte Ltd, conducted a GDX codenamed Exercise Spectrum at the Tanah Merah Ferry Terminal. Such joint exercises serve to validate the operational protocol to ensure a swift and decisive response to any public security incident at the checkpoints.



Staying Vigilant, United and Resilient through SGSecure

Launched in 2016, SGSecure equips members of the public with skills and knowledge to detect suspicious behaviours (including signs of radicalisation) and items, and how to respond if caught in a terrorist attack, e.g., “Run, Hide, Tell”, improvised first aid, and how to help keep Singapore cohesive in the aftermath of a terrorist attack.

The SGSecure movement has helped to raise public awareness of the threat of terrorism and empowered many residents to pick up emergency preparedness (EP) skills (see box below). However, public complacency remains a concern. Less than half (46%) of respondents believed that Singapore is a target for terrorist attacks.

The latest national-level survey¹⁰ showed that:



65%

of respondents agreed that they were generally alert and would keep a lookout for suspicious behaviours or items when in a public place.



52%

of respondents said that they would contact the relevant authorities if they believed that one of their loved ones (e.g., family, relative or friend) was displaying signs of radicalisation.



69%

of respondents were familiar with or trained in at least one lifesaving skill.



83%

of respondents believed that all Singaporeans would stand united regardless of race or religion should a terrorist attack happen in Singapore.



91%

of respondents were also willing to help other Singaporeans affected by a terrorist attack.

¹⁰ MDDI conducted a national-level survey from May to July 2025, to gauge public awareness and perception towards national security issues, including the threat of terrorism and participation in emergency preparedness efforts as part of the SGSecure movement. The survey involved a representative sample of 2,011 Singapore Citizens and Permanent Residents (aged 15 and above) through face-to-face interviews.

When the SGSecure Programme Office conducted a series of social experiments involving obvious suspicious objects placed in public places in June 2025, only 17.3% of the 2,530 people who walked past noticed, and of this group, only about 5.9% intended or took steps to inform the authorities.

Members of the public can contribute by signing up as an SGSecure Responder. SGSecure Responders help to play various roles in keeping Singapore safe from the threat of terrorism. Explore these roles by watching the SGSecure Responders' Network Animated Video (Refer to Annex A). To sign up as a Responder, simply **download the SGSecure app** and register via the “Respond” function.

For more details, members of the public are encouraged to refer to SGSecure's official website and **social media platforms** for the latest advisories, educational materials and updates on how to respond to terrorism-related incidents.



SGSECURE
STAY ALERT. STAY UNITED. STAY STRONG.

SGSecure official social accounts



Download the SGSecure app here



Importance of Early Detection and Reporting

Self-radicalised individuals often act alone, and may require little preparation to carry out an attack using simple and easily available weapons. This makes early detection particularly important. The majority of youths investigated by ISD had displayed signs of radicalisation,

such as expressing support for terrorist groups, to people around them – particularly their family members and friends – before coming to the authorities' attention. Recent cases underscore the important role that those around a radicalised individual can play.



The 15-year-old self-radicalised youth detained by ISD in April 2026 had displayed signs of radicalisation, such as sharing pro-ISIS content online. While his family members and acquaintances appeared to have been aware of his extremist views, none reported their concerns to the authorities.



REPORTED

In the case of the 19-year-old detained by ISD in May 2026, his family members had noticed that he had become increasingly withdrawn but did not take further action. However, several of his friends had attempted to dissuade him from his extremist beliefs and alerted ISD to his behaviour, enabling timely intervention.



REPORTED

In the case of the 14-year-old detained by ISD in June 2026, someone in his school had noticed his interest in violent videos and alerted the authorities.

These cases illustrate why family members, friends, educators and others who interact regularly with an individual are best placed to notice indicators of radicalisation. Regardless of the extremist ideologies involved, these indicators include, but are not limited to, the following:




Displaying signs or symbols of extremist / terrorist groups (e.g., displaying the ISIS flag as one's social media profile photo)



Frequently surfing radical websites



Demonstrating a fascination with extreme violence, gore and weapons



Posting / sharing extremist views on social media platforms, such as expressing support / admiration for terrorists / terrorist groups as well as the use of violence



Sharing extremist views with family, friends and relatives



Making remarks that promote ill-will or hatred towards people of other races, religions or communities



Expressing intent to participate in acts of violence overseas or in Singapore



Inciting others to participate in acts of violence

The authorities may not always be able to detect radicalised individuals before they act. Public vigilance and early reporting is thus critical. The public should promptly report to ISD if they suspect that somebody close to them might be radicalised.

Doing so allows the individual to receive the timely help they need, and keeps society safe. It is important not to dismiss or overlook signs of radicalisation, even when there is uncertainty about how serious they may be. Early reporting can make a critical difference.

Making a report does not automatically result in action under the ISA. When a report is made, ISD will carry out checks to assess the information provided. The identity of the individual making the report will be kept confidential. No further action will be taken if the person is not found to be radicalised. If the individual is in the early stage of radicalisation, they may be referred for counselling or other interventions, without the need to be dealt with under the ISA.



If you have any information on any threat to Singapore's security, such as a suspected case of radicalisation, contact ISD at:



ISD Hotline
1800-2626-473



ISD Email
isd@mha.gov.sg

Stay vigilant, stay informed. Follow ISD on:



ISD Facebook
**Internal Security
Department**



ISD Instagram
@isd.singapore



ISD LinkedIn
**Internal Security
Department**

ANNEX

SGSecure: How you can find out more, spread the word, get involved – and play your role in keeping Singapore safe and secure!

Watch the New Campaign Film and Attend the New Series of Roadshows

SGSecure Campaign 2026: “Play Your Role”

The SGSecure movement launched the new *Play Your Role* campaign in March 2026, which builds on the previous *What's Your Role* by stressing the importance of individual responsibility and action.

The campaign film, “*Closer Than We Think*”, depicts a terrorist attack and traces the perpetrator’s self-radicalisation in reverse. It highlights warning signs that were not acted upon and the importance of early reporting. The film is available on MHA’s YouTube channel and @SGSecureOfficial social media accounts.



As part of this campaign, a new series of the SGSecure Roadshow has been launched, featuring exhibits and activities set in familiar places such as housing estate and hawker centres. Visitors may learn how they can act to prevent or respond to a terrorist incident at these roadshows. Members of the public are encouraged to follow SGSecure’s official social media accounts to stay updated on upcoming roadshows, including when and where they will be held.



Visitors interacting with the new SGSecure Roadshow exhibits

ANNEX

How You Can Support SGSecure

Equip Yourself with Emergency Preparedness Skills

We encourage everyone to equip yourself with emergency preparedness skills to respond in an emergency:

- The SCDF conducts free emergency preparedness training as part of its Responders Plus Programme (RPP). You may learn more and sign-up at SCDF's website.
- The Singapore Red Cross (SRC) also conducts training in first aid and psychological first aid (how to provide emotional support to individuals affected by traumatic incidents). You may learn more and sign-up at the SRC's website.

SGSecure on Roblox

Members of the public, especially youths, can also learn useful skills through the SGSecure mini-games within the SPF's MATA-verse game on Roblox. Aligning with three core pillars – Stay Alert, Stay Strong and Stay united, the game play allows players to learn how to identify and report suspicious behaviour, respond during an attack, basic awareness on emergency preparedness skills and recognise misinformation.



Share Advisories with your Family, Friends and Followers

SGSecure puts out advisories on social media that are designed to be shared with your friends, family and followers. One example is Bye Tech Neck, available on MHA's YouTube channel and @SGSecureOfficial social media accounts, and also screened on public transport in April. This video reminds everyone to stay alert to their surroundings and not be distracted by mobile devices.



Another example is a video developed by MHA in partnership with Team Nila and The Kallang, that shows you what to do and where to go during emergencies at large-scale events. The video is screened at venues in The Kallang, including the National Stadium, Singapore Indoor Stadium and OCBC Arena, during major sporting and entertainment events. You may also find this video on MHA's YouTube channel and @SGSecureOfficial social media accounts.



There is SGSecure content in a variety of formats and languages – including Mandarin-language video <https://go.gov.sg/kkmp-proposal-radicalisation> (with MDDI and King Kong Media) which tells a story about the importance of reporting signs of radicalisation early, and a longer-form in-depth discussion on The Rishi Report podcast featuring Senior Minister Shanmugam on national security and youth radicalisation. Watch our other video collaborations here!

Follow SGSecure's official social media accounts to watch these videos and share them within your networks to help raise awareness!

ANNEX

How You Can Sign Up as an SGSecure Responder

SGSecure Responders' Network Animated Video

Watch the SGSecure Responders' Network animated video on MHA's YouTube channel to learn the various roles you can play as an SGSecure Responder.

You can sign up as an SGSecure Responder via the SGSecure application.



Take Part in Community Activities

You may participate in community events such as Community Resilience Days and Safety and Security Carnivals to learn how to respond during emergencies. Key activities include firefighting demonstrations,

CPR-AED training and volunteering opportunities. Look out for announcements on your constituency's social media pages, and posters and flyers at community spaces or near your home.



Holland-Bukit Timah & Bukit Panjang Community Resilience Day



Moulmein-Cairnhill Amaryllis Ville Condominium Safety and Security Carnival

For Organisations and Community Partners

Organisations can also take the following steps to strengthen preparedness:

- If you are a business or workplace leader, visit the [SGSecure@Workplaces](#) page on the SGSecure website for resources or emergency planning and staff training.
- If you are part of a religious organisation, refer to the [Crisis Preparedness for Religious Organisations](#) website for more resources to strengthen preparedness and safeguard your congregation.

- If you are an educator or school leader, access SGSecure resources for educators on SGSecure website to support student awareness and emergency preparedness.

More information and resources for each group are available on the SGSecure website. By staying informed, learning new skills, sharing knowledge and participating in community activities, every individual can play a part in keeping Singapore safe and secure.



 facebook.com/mhaisd  [Internal Security Department](https://www.instagram.com/Internal_Security_Department)
 isd.gov.sg

